The Oracles of Science, I discuss the limits of an emphasis on so-called philosophical bridges in the relationship between science and religion. Epistemological and metaphysical analyses of the claims by scientists and religious people are indeed necessary to avoid illegitimate extrapolations; but a clear separation between scientific and religious statements is problematic. Following Ludwig Fleck's characterisation of the esoteric and the exoteric circles of science, I argue that popularization of science is always embedded in scientific cultures and ideological agendas and that one cannot expect a clear demarcation criterion between pure science and pure popularization. I also consider Lyda Walsh's rhetorical analysis of the scientists as prophets to understand the oracles' public portrayal of science in pseudo-religious terms.
The Oracles is a nicely written book, accessible to a wide audience, with a clear thesis: many supposed controversies between science and religion come from illegitimate inferences and lack of solid philosophical analyses by a few, but very popular scientists.
Indeed, this is one of the main arguments in the thought of Artigas, one that is deeply rooted in the tradition of Thomism, loosely understood.
From his point of view, conflicts between modern science and the Catholic faith (or, at times, with religion at large) dissolve when proper philosophical and metaphysical examination of the scope, presuppositions and methods of the sciences take place. The so-called dialogue between science and religion is either mediated by the bridge of a realist philosophy or it becomes a dialogue of the deaf, so he argued. Of course, the problem here lies in what he considered to be a valid philosophy for analysis: one that accepts that both science and faith are in the business of truth and that there is no such thing as 'double truth', which distanced him from the extremes of both scientism and religious fundamentalism.
However commendable the Oracles is, my interest in this paper is not so much on what it says, but on what it does not say. Specifically, I want to argue that beyond the stance on the intrinsic epistemic limitations and scope of science, religion and theology, as well as the potential philosophical bridges or chasms between them, this book hints at a topic that Artigas seldom addressed, and then only in the last years of his career; namely, that the science-and-religion disputes are public disputes that transcend the close limits of what he thought to be legitimate science and legitimate religion. Indeed, when Giberson and Artigas (2007, 4) complain that the oracles "have impeccable scientific pedigrees, but it is their unusual gift for communication that has given them a platform for speaking to millions outside the academic community, rather than the tiny audiences of specialists to whom their colleagues speak," they implicitly establish a neat distinction 1 The celebrity scientists in the book were Richard Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould, Stephen Hawking, Carl Sagan, Steven Weinberg and Edward O. Wilson. between science and non-science, following the demarcationist tradition of neo-positivism. Distinguishing between 'provinces of knowledge', disciplines, methods and illegitimate inferences is one of the main tasks of the philosopher, and indeed a much-needed one; but historians and sociologists of science have shown that attempts to clarify the boundaries between science and religion, science and politics, science and power, or even the classical dichotomy between science and technology, are bound to failure. Therefore, a surgical distinction between what the oracles legitimately say and do in their areas of expertise and what they do in the public sphere is only one way, necessary but limited, to censure the abuses of celebrity scientists.
In this paper I want to draw attention to alternative ways in which one can understand and decry the excesses of celebrity scientists, drawing from the tradition of what is vaguely known as Science Studies. Specifically, I would like to challenge the notion that one can naturalise the demarcation between science (or the sciences) and religion(s), faith(s) or theology(ies).
An essentialist view of any of these notions can be problematic and so are, thus, the boundaries between them, both historically and sociologically. In the first section I shall point at some aspects of the history of the evolution of what 'true' science was, or was perceived to be, both in Christian and secular contexts. With this, the demarcation between science and religion will prove to be complex enough so as to help us understand one of the reasons why the phenomenon of the oracles is not so strange as one might think.
In section two I shall delve into the question of science popularization.
The oracles act as popularisers, and very ideologically biased ones for that matter. However, the received view of a strict separation between true science and popular science on which Artigas and Giberson base their argument is historically and sociologically problematic. The boundaries between esoteric and exoteric circles of science are blurred, and thus one cannot criticise the oracles only because they offer a highly prejudiced view of science. Rather, I want to argue that it is precisely in the fact that they present themselves as 'priests of Nature' where one can find another Achilles heel of theirs.
In other words, one might want to accept that the oracles have opinions and present them in the name of science, whatever that means; but not J A U M E N AVA R RO that they put them forward as the only valid interpretation of science. As we shall see, their dogmatic approach goes against the democratic turn in science that has taken place among many Science Studies scholars.
Finally, in the third section I recall the prophetic ethos of science in all times. Why is it that the New Atheism uses science as one of their main allies? I shall argue that oracular rhetorical strategies are not so alien to science as one might think. Promises, predictions and confidence are part and parcel of the way modern science has developed and is still developing.
Just think, for instance, in the increasingly large sections devoted to outcome, social impact and outreach in any grant application nowadays. As we shall see, institutional science is oracular, and not only its popular side. Although the journal was meant to have a broad coverage, with theological, social, legal and ethical topics, the first article after the editorial in the first issue was devoted to "Free Science and Revelation". The essay started praising the "vast intellectual work amassed by the scientific activity of the last one-hundred years" only to continue with a complaint about the misuse of scientific productions to combat Revelation, and a defence that "good science" should include God and Revelation. After criticising the Enlightenment's "philosophism" and 19 th -century "rationalism", the article complained that "the elimination of God from the field of human science is the fundamental axiom of modern philosophy, separating itself radically from the Christian and Scholastic duality" (Murillo 1901, 8-9) .
The author of this article, the Jesuit scholar in Scripture Lino Murillo (1901, 22) , claimed that the "main consequence of the irreligious movements in Spain has been to form, not men of science, but practical sceptics, […] and political revolutionaries". This attitude is significant in the context of This professional dimension of the science-religion disputes in Victorian Britain, famously described first by the late Frank Turner (1974 Turner ( , 1978 , is worth remembering. The configuration of modern science as we know it today is now commonly regarded as a process happening throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, a process that is not only intellectual or philosophical but also institutional, cultural and professional (Cunningham and Williams, 1993 Huxley and his fellow X-Club members disregarded the Anglican Church because they saw it as the enemy in their attempts to professionalize science and to gain access to the traditional academic institutions. ID supporters disregard contemporary science because they fear the attacks on their religious beliefs and practices by the excesses of naturalism. Neo-Thomists in the early twentieth century despised some modern science because it was not "true" science and it was used as a rhetorical weapon in the secularizing process of political structures. In all cases one of the main elements under scrutiny was the very nature of what science had to be, and who was legitimized to speak for it. From this point of view, thus, the oracles of science are only adding to this long tradition of battles for the appropriation and supremacy in this thing we call science.
Popularization and the esoteric circles of science
The Oracles of Science deals with the contentious topic of what is normally known as popularization or vulgarization of science. The traditional diffusion
model states that the experts in any field are the ones in charge of making specialised knowledge available to the general, largely ignorant public. This paternalistic, top-down view on how to educate the masses has been highly criticised, and not just as a naïve reaction against all forms of authoritarianism. The diffusion model assumes that knowledge is produced in certain very esoteric circles that, like ivory towers isolated from the world, manage to remain unpolluted from external interferences that would contaminate the purity of science. Only after such pure knowledge is produced would the experts be allowed to transmit it to the general public in a digested way.
Thus, we fall again in an essentialist view of science that allows for clear demarcations: the ivory tower would have well-defined methodological and institutional boundaries so as to police, like a Maxwell's demon, who should be part of the scientific elite.
The question often arises as to who appointed Dawkins, Hawking and other oracles as spokespersons for science, let alone religion, and why their views on science would be more legitimate than anyone else's. Because, as Giberson and Artigas (2007, 9) argued, "the scientific community, through the lenses of its six leading spokespersons, is hostile to religion, atheistic, and primarily engaged in the investigation of origins. None of these characterizations are true. Science is not hostile to religion, scientists are not consistently atheistic, and origins are not the primary focus of scientific investigation". The crux of the matter is that "science" is not a something. Science is neither one institution nor one set of doctrines or one specific behaviour. Science is, above all a human activity and, thus, a contingent and changing one. "The scientific community is a gigantic worldwide network of scholars trained in a broad cross section of disciplines, supported by a variety of funding entities, and assisted by a vast technical and publishing infrastructure" (7). That is why no single interpretation of this thing we call science can be regarded as uniquely valid.
"And therein lies the problem", argue Giberson and Artigas. "When a small handful of leaders step forward to speak for the whole, there arises the possibility that their portrayals of science may be skewed or even distorted and science might be misunderstood" (7). Unique, almost dogmatic interpretations of science and its contents, which is what the oracles often
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do, clashes with many contemporary views on how science actually works.
The problem is not only their all-encompassing scientism, but also that their scientism is based on a very particular, exclusive and highly problem- Many decades ago, Ludwig Fleck (1935 Fleck ( /1979 suggested that a scientific fact was the outcome of a thought collective and thought styles. The former he defined as a "community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction" (1979, 39) and the latter as "the readiness for directed perception, with corresponding mental and objective assimilation of what has been so perceived" (99). Contrary to Thomas Kuhn's later notion of "scientific community", one characteristic of which was the strict separation between those converted to one paradigm and those loyal to another, incommensurable one, Fleck's thought collective has a more fluid structure, consisting "of both a small esoteric circle and a larger exoteric circle, each consisting of members belonging to the thought collective and forming around any work of the mind, such as a dogma of faith, a scientific idea, or an artistic musing". Moreover, a thought collective "consists of many When science is made socially accountable, the chances for the oracles to have their own way largely diminish. While they are entitled to act as popularisers or even to make logically or metaphysically erroneous extrapolations, their authority as spokespersons for science is challenged. In other words, the participatory turn in science is not mainly a way to democratise the most esoteric circles of science but, moreover, the exoteric ones. Thus, attempts by the oracles to act in the name of science may be immediately undermined not only because they are true or false, legitimate or illegitimate, but because they are top-down, dogmatic interpretations of the nature and content of their views on science.
Ironically, that was the major criticism of Sokal and Bricmont to what they regarded as the Intellectual Impostures of the Humanities and the Social Sciences. Their success in publishing the hoax article "Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity" (Sokal, 1996) wanted to prove the contrast between serious, peer-reviewed, methodological sound sciences with postmodern gibberish. Fair enough. 
Oracles, prophets and science
If democratic and participatory understandings of science challenge the priestly status of the expert in the very construction of science, let alone its interpretations, why is it oracles still exist, and not without popular success?
Perhaps we should not blame them and their arguments only. "Like the traditional oracles of classical Greece, Shakespeare, and even the hit movies about the Matrix, they tell us what we need to know. Are we alone in the universe? Where did we come from? Did the universe have a beginning?
Is there a point to our existence? Are we the products of random chance?" (Giberson and Artigas, 2007, 5) . Pace Max Weber, the modern world does not seem to be as disenchanted as some might think.
In an article initially intended for the Oracles, but published years later, Giberson (2011) stated that "in subtle and implicit ways, though, the arch-critics of religion are realizing that humans need more from science than factual accounts of how we got here and accurate descriptions of the world we inhabit". Scientific accounts "provide no larger context for our lives, no guidance for how we should live, no insights into right and wrong, no recipes for the building of community. They do not, on their own, have
anything to say about purpose. So, while they may be exciting on one level, they fall short of serving as replacement religions" (Giberson 2011, 206) .
The quasi-religious statements of the oracles in their popular books try to fill this gap. 'Science is all there is', so the mantra of the oracle goes; and 'if factual science is not enough, let us introduce ethical, religious and mystical notions wrapped under the guise of science'. In this way the first premise, 'science is all there is', remains intact.
That the oracles are trying to re-enchant the world through science is rather obvious. More surprising may be the fact that they try to do so while holding a positivistic and authoritarian view of science. Who grants the scientists, or perhaps better, "science", such authority over society?
Lynda Walsh has an answer to this question worth noting. In her Scientists as Prophets. A Rhetorical Genealogy, Walsh (2013) argues that the rhetorical structure of modern science, now as well as in the times of Francis Bacon, is in continuation with the place of oracles in Ancient Greece or prophets in the Old Testament. In all cases, she argues, we find the same "prophetic ethos": "a role that a polity-a group of people who must work together to stay together-authorizes to manufacture certainty for them". The role of that prophetic ethos would be to grant "political certainty" in times of crisis:
"When a polity encounters a crisis in which right action cannot be ascertained via traditional democratic debate, it turns to its prophets. But while it expects certain knowledge from those prophets, what it gets from them instead is a dialogue that can lead to political certainty" (Walsh 2013, 2 here we reach a loophole: the same metaphors that helped guide the initial stages of a research may re-appear explicitly after a theory is developed and needs to be explained. In Walsh's words (2013, 148) : "When these theory-constitutive metaphors are in turn employed as "exegetical" metaphors to explain science to the public, we get a sort of epistemological and rhetorical "black hole": the divinatory metaphors used to answer questions about the natural world become the very way we experience those insensible aspects of the natural world". Thus, the oracles cannot be blamed for using metaphors in their representation of nature; only, perhaps, for not making the public explicitly aware of this resource.
Finally, the uncontrollability of media messages accounts for the success of the oracles. In Delphos, the pythia would never say something totally alien to the expectations of the city. Her messages were vague enough so as to generate consensus, and in order to incite assent they would never frontally challenge the status quo of the contestants. In the case of modern oracles, this is a "good reminder that prophet's messages must confirm underlying currents in public discourse to be heard, and that a prophet cannot unilaterally determine the outcome of a dialogue that he begins with the polity" (Walsh 2013, 151) . In other words, the success of the oracles of science in their attacks to most forms of religion can only be explained not on the grounds of their arguments but because they authoritatively say what a part of the public opinion already want to hear.
The oracles "are the 'public intellectuals' of this generation, perennially present in media outlets […] They are the leaders of the Third Culture, doing exactly what C.P. Snow lamented was not getting done" (Giberson and Artigas 2007, 7) . But, ironically, the result is not what Snow expected would happen. With their abuse of prophetic rhetoric, rather than bridging the gap between the Sciences and the Humanities, they reinforce those boundaries; the oracles present their science, not as common sense but as special knowledge granted only to them, thus "reinforcing the extraordinary calling of scientists-prophets" (Walsh 2013, 154) .
Conclusion
In 1870 Attention to the locality of the oracles' arguments is thus an essential point to stress in the philosophical analysis of potential conflicts.
